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Infrastructure has particular challenges in public 
procurement, because it is highly complex and 
customized and often requires economic, political 
and social considerations from a long time horizon. 
To deliver public infrastructure services to citizens or 
taxpayers, there are a series of decisions that governments 
have to make. The paper provides a minimum package 
of important economic theories that could guide 
governments to wise decision-making at each stage. 
Theory suggests that in general it would be a good 
option to contract out infrastructure to the private 
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sector under high-powered incentive mechanisms, such 
as fixed-price contracts. However, this holds under 
certain conditions. Theory also shows that ownership 
should be aligned with the ultimate responsibility for or 
objective of infrastructure provision. Public and private 
ownership have different advantages and can deal with 
different problems. It is also shown that it would be a 
better option to integrate more than one public task 
(for example, investment and operation) into the same 
ownership, whether public or private, if they exhibit 
positive externalities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Infrastructure poses challenges that are not found in other areas of public procurement. The 
fundamental reason is that infrastructure is a highly complex and customized object and 
therefore, not only economic but also political, social and environmental considerations 
would be required from a long time horizon. In order to deliver public infrastructure services 
to citizens or taxpayers, there are a series of decisions that governments have to make. At 
each stage, there are several important economic theories that could guide government 
decision-making. This paper aims to provide a minimum package of theoretical propositions 
to answer such policy questions by reviewing representative contributions. Having said that, 
some important features in reality, such as political and institutional conditions, may not be 
taken into account in order to focus on theoretical discussion. Also, this is not a survey; there 
are of course many other theoretical developments beyond the paper.
1
Second, once governments decide to procure goods and services from the outside, the next 
question is how to align authorities and responsibilities with stakeholders. There are different 
stakeholders that can carry out some pieces of discrete tasks, including ownership. Who 
 But the paper focuses 
on practicability and simplicity through interpreting theoretical models intuitively, rather 
than restating formal proofs. For further details, including theoretical assumptions and 
conclusions, see the cited original papers.  
 
A sequence of governmental decisions on infrastructure procurement may be fourfold, as 
shown in Figure 1. First, governments must decide whether to produce infrastructure goods 
and services in-house or procure them from the outside, which refers to any entity other than 
government employees. This is a traditional question of public economics. The primary 
question is: Under what conditions should governments choose the option of contracting-out? 
This can be addressed by traditional incentive theory and incomplete contract theory 
developed since Hart (1995; 2003) and Hart et al. (1997).  
 
                                                 
1 For comprehensive studies, see Dimitri et al. (2006) and Janssen (2004).   - 3 - 
should own infrastructure? Who should operate? Who should invest in public assets? Under 
what circumstances could those tasks be delegated to different agents? What circumstances 
call for bundling them together under a single agent? The theoretical approach that views 
public procurement as a problem of bundling and unbundling multiple distinct tasks could 
reply to these questions (e.g., Hart, 2003; Bennett and Iossa, 2005). While bundling 
everything under state ownership means nationalization of infrastructure, unbundling some 
of the tasks can represent some forms of private sector participation in infrastructure, as in 






















Third, when the scope of public tasks being delegated to outside contractors is determined, 
governments need to make a decision on how to select the best private partner. This is 
addressed largely by auction theory, which is normally discussed under the totally different 
setting from (incomplete) contract theory. The selection of agents or contractors raises a 
series of questions. How should auctioneers design the award mechanism for efficiency 
purposes? What mechanisms are available to assess potential venders, operators and 
contractors? How could governments prevent and detect collusion and corruption? Is there 
any optimal level of competition in public tendering? How could governments encourage 
                                                 
2 The economic literature on public procurement has made tremendous progress in recent decades.
 See, for 
example, the comprehensive study of Laffont and Tirole (1993). On public–private partnerships, see Harris 
(2003) for an account of recent trends in developing countries. Also see IMF (2004). 
In-house or contract out? 
Bundle or unbundle 
construction and operation? 





Ex post adjustment or 
incentive contract?  Ex post adjustment model   - 4 - 
more bidder participation to achieve auction efficiency? There are a number of theoretical 
propositions in this area. The current paper selectively discusses some of them.  
 
Finally, after the commencement of a contract, there is a high likelihood or risk that either 
contractor or government would seek for ex post adjustment of the contract for some reason. 
There are potentially a number of unforeseeable and thus non-contractible issues in public 
procurement, especially in long-term complex infrastructure projects. A certain number of 
studies have discussed the relationship between ex ante contracting and ex post adjustment 
(e.g., Bajari and Tedelis, 2001; Guasch et al., 2007, 2008). Notably, if flexible contractual 
arrangements are preferred rather than strong incentive contracts, the government decision 
making may return to the first question on whether to contract out public infrastructure to the 
private sector because it implies some difficulties in contracting out. This is not surprising 
because a series of government decisions are normally dynamic and evolutionary.  
 
Procurement in infrastructure has gathered renewed momentum because of the recent 
upsurge and following slowdown of private sector participation in infrastructure as well as 
the reemergence of the state role in infrastructure development. In tandem, the economic 
literature continues providing a number of insightful propositions. The remaining sections are 
organized as follows. Section II discusses the first question of whether to produce public 
work in-house or contract it out to outsiders. Section III examines who should take the 
responsibility for what. In Section IV some of the important propositions from auction theory 
are reviewed in the context of infrastructure procurement. Section V provides some 
important foundations from theories on ex post adjustments or renegotiation.  
 
 
II. IN-HOUSE OR CONTRACTING OUT?   
 
Traditional economic theory has characterized procurement as a principal-agent relationship 
where the government, as a benevolent principal, intends to accomplish a piece of public 
work that cannot be performed by itself and therefore delegate the task to an agent, which   - 5 - 
could be either a government employee or a private company. A seminal contribution by 
Laffont and Tirole (1993) provides a comprehensive view of the incentive problem in public 
procurement. The main source of difficulty in the principal-agent model is that the 
government cannot observe some critical information of its agent, such as agent’s made 
efforts and its trustworthiness, namely type, which can also be interpreted as its owned 
intrinsic technology (i.e., efficient or inefficient agent). If the government knew the agent’s 
type or could observe the effort made by the agent, it could simply negotiate directly with 
each agent and mandate the optimal level of effort given each known type. In reality, 
however, the government often lacks the information of who are the efficient agents, how 
much effort they made and to what extent the performance would be attributable to their 
efforts (i.e., asymmetric information problem). Even though the government can observe the 
agent’s type or effort, it may not be verifiable because of judicial or customary flaws.   
 
Therefore, a matter of concern in public procurement emerges as a problem of incentives. 
The government cannot monitor the agent’s effort toward cost cutting and may not be able to 
induce its agent to make the maximum of effort to contain public procurement costs (i.e., 
moral hazard or hidden action problem). The government may also be faced with an adverse 
selection or hidden knowledge problem, because it has less information about the technology 
than the agent. It is noteworthy that in incentive theory, the cost of producing or delivering a 
public work is assumed to be observable, contractible and enforceable. In other words, even 
though the agent’s true cost can be observed, it does not solve an entanglement of the hidden 
types and unobservable efforts.  
 
The incentive theory highlights a basic trade-off between cost reduction and rent extraction. 
A positive rent is needed to withdraw the efficient level of effort from the efficient agent, 
while no rent has to be left for the inefficient agent. When comparing bipolar contractual 
forms that are common in public procurement, fixed-price and cost-plus contracts, the 
conclusion may suggest the relative importance of the former, because the fixed payment 
arrangement entitles the agent to retain a potential savings or rent generated by its effort   - 6 - 
toward cost cutting.
3
The property rights literature explains the role of asset ownership in the principal-agent 
relationship for general public contracts (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 
1990; Hart, 1995; Whinston 2003). It does not assume completeness of contracts but 
maintains the assumption that two parties involved (i.e., a procuring government and a 
contractor) are locked in the contractual relationship. The contractor can make an effort 
toward improving the value of the asset, i.e., infrastructure, but the level of effort (or 
investment) made by the contractor is not observed or contractible by the government. 
 Under cost-plus contracts, on the other hand, the agent cannot exploit 
any savings regardless of realized cost reductions, leaving little incentive to make an effort.  
 
Proposition 1. Under the principal-agent relationship, fixed-price contracts are more 
consistent with the optimal incentive package that could induce efficient contractors to make 
the maximum effort to cost reductions in public works.  
 
A shortcoming of traditional incentive theory, however, is that contracts are assumed 
complete. If a contract were complete and could account for all conceivable contingencies, 
ownership would not matter, because the government could control every aspect of the 
relationship through the contract and achieve the efficient outcome regardless of ownership 
structure. In reality, complex public works, such as infrastructure development projects, often 
violate this assumption. When contracts are incomplete, it is ownership that determines who 
has the right to control unforeseen events that would happen. One of the earliest studies 
casting light on contractual incompleteness is Simon (1951), in which the implicit 
employment relationship is analyzed.  
 
                                                 
3 As will be discussed in the following sections, particularly Section V, this bipolar classification may not be 
straightforward in practice. For instance, even fixed-price contracts can be ex post modified under certain 
conditions. In conventional infrastructure concessions, a price adjustment mechanism is stipulated in the 
contract as a clear formula. But there may remain some ambiguity in applying it, for example when X-
inefficiency is taken into account. In other cases, some parts of the contract are fixed while others are ex post 
adjustable, as in some public contracts in the United Kingdom (see below).    - 7 - 
Ownership, which is assumed to be predetermined before the transaction, namely at time 0, 
would decide how to divide the outcome, which is after all observable for both parties.
4
                                                 
4 In both theory and practice, nonetheless, it is still open to argument what ownership means. It may vary from 
model to model. See, for instance, Hart and Moore (1990), Hart (1995), and Hart et al. (1997).  
  
 
Under the above setting, there are two possible regimes to realize this public work: in-house 
provision and procuring it from the outside. The former option can also be referred to as 
nationalization, public infrastructure provision and state-owned enterprises. The latter may 
represent privatization and traditional public procurement from the outside.  
 
It is clear that there is no incentive for the agent to make any efforts to improve the value of 
infrastructure when the transaction is internalized under the state ownership, because the 
government who owns the asset will exploit the entire surplus from the project at the end. 
Therefore, the optimal choice for the contractor is to make no effort. This represents the 
typical public ownership failure that government officials would not be motivated to improve 
the quality of public services, thus retaining operational inefficiency. Everywhere is evidence 
for this (e.g., Megginson et al., 1994; Jimenez, 1995; Morrison and Schwartz, 1996; Koski 
and Majumdar, 2000; Wallstern, 2001, 2002). For example, the public ownership and 
provision of infrastructure services tends to suffer from much low labor productivity, and 
therefore, infrastructure PPP almost always bring about labor retrenchment in Latin America 
(Table 1). Governmental operators are in general considered less able to control operating 
costs, slower to adopt new technologies and managerial practices, and less responsible to the 
needs of users (e.g., Besant-Jones, 2006; Andres et al., 2008).  
 
Proposition 2. Under the incompleteness of contracts, there is no incentive for public 
officials to make efforts to improve efficiency in infrastructure provision under the public 
ownership (and provision).  
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Table 1. Improvement of privatized electricity distribution companies in Latin America 
Country Chile Peru
Company EDESUR EDENOR CHILECTRA Luz Del Sur
Year privatized 1992 1992 1987 1994
Change in energy sales (%) 79 82 26 19
Change in energy losses (%) –68 –63 –70 –50
Change in employment (%) –60 –63 –9 –43
Change in customers per employee (%) 180 215 37 135
Change in net receivables (days) –38 … –68 –27
Change in provisions for bad debts (% of sales) –35 … –88 –65
Argentina
 
Source: Besant-Jones (2006).  
 
On the other hand, if the government chooses to procure the public work from the outside, 
the level of efforts by the contractor may not be zero but still suboptimal, because the 
improved outcome will be partly shared by the government. In this case, it is assumed that a 
bargaining game over the ownership of the asset would take place. While the government is 
faced with a hold-up problem in the sense that there is no alternative option to procure this 
project, the contractor may have a positive reservation price of the object being delivered. 
Given the expected bargaining outcome, the contractor can select the optimal level of efforts, 
which would turn out less than the optimum.
5
The model can be extended to include various elements that are not contractible ex ante and 
not enforceable by a third party, e.g., courts and regulators. For example, the quality of 
infrastructure work delivered or services provided may be non-contractible. Hart et al. (1997) 
discuss the cost and quality of services under the public and private provision, specifically 
questioning when a government should provide public goods in-house, given its imperfect 
ability to observe the agent’s effort toward cost reduction and quality improvement. In their 
model, a benevolent government, which owns a facility, can either hire a manager, i.e., a 
  
 
Proposition 3. In traditional public procurement from the outside, the level of efforts made by 
contractors is not zero but still remains suboptimal.  
 
                                                 
5 Under the assumption that the agent’s cost function of effort (or investment) is convex, it can be shown that 
the socially optimal level of efforts, which maximizes the benefit from quality improvement by efforts minus 
agent’s cost associated with those efforts, would exceed the level of efforts selected by the agent under the 
incomplete contract context (Hart, 1995).    - 9 - 
government employee, or privatize the facility and let a private contractor to operate it.
6
By contrast, under the state ownership, again, there is little incentive for government 
employees to contain the public costs and improve the quality of infrastructure services. 
Underinvestment in both quality improvement and cost reduction would likely happen. The 
government officials may invest some in quality improvement but not sufficiently. The 
reason is the same as the above: The manager has to share the gains from increased quality 
with the government through a bargaining game. In general, when a reduction in supply costs 
causes only a small deterioration in quality, the private ownership provides the better 
incentive for quality improvements and cost-cutting. As the downside of quality reduction 
grows, the in-house provision may become superior, as seen in some recent nationalization 
episodes. In the unbundled, privatized railway sector, coordination failure may significantly 
 Thus, 
ownership and provision are tied together. Of particular note, it is also assumed that the 
government is concerned about the quality of infrastructure services, which are ex post 
observable but not contractible ex ante. On the other hand, the manager or contractor does 
not care directly about quality but can influence the level of quality through its private effort 
or investment. Under these circumstances, there are two possible actions for the public or 
private manager: making an effort to improve quality and introducing an innovation to 
reduce costs at the cost of deteriorated quality. In any case, the agent has to bear the cost 
associated with efforts to improve quality and contain costs.  
 
Under the private ownership, there is the maximum incentive to invest in cost reduction and 
quality improvement, because, unlike governmental officials, a private operator does not 
have to obtain the consent on new innovations from the authorities. However, the privatized 
operator may invest too much in cost reduction technologies because the deterioration in 
quality caused by cost reduction measures may not be taken into account. In general, private 
contracting is cheaper but can threaten quality. The realized quality could be greater or lesser 
than the optimum.  
 
                                                 
6 In this case, ownership means nothing but the right to use the facility.    - 10 - 
increase broken rails and safety concerns, as seen in the United Kingdom (Martin, 2002). In a 
vertically integrated system, possibly under state ownership, track, passenger and freight 
operations may be coordinated better. A more complex regulatory system is required for 
safety, coordination of operations, and investment in the vertically separated privatization 
approach (Kessides, 2004).  
 
Proposition 4. Private ownership provides the maximum incentive for quality improvements 
and cost-cutting when the latter has a small adverse effect on the former. Public ownership 
may have the advantage when cost-cutting deteriorates quality significantly.  
 
The efficiency of in-house provision also depends on the strength of the incentives of 
government employees as well as the importance to the government of generating quality 
innovations. In Andhra Pradesh, India, the state government unbundled the electricity sector 
to the generation, transmission and distribution functions. Each segment was designed to take 
the responsibility for managing its operations as a corporate entity under the state ownership. 
Tariffs among the segments are periodically reviewed in an independent manner, and the 
government also launched an intensive collection campaign while strengthening the 
anticorruption policies in the utilities. Even with the state ownership maintained, the sector 
performance improved considerably. The system losses declined from 38 percent in 1999 to 
26 percent in 2003. The collection rate increased to 98 percent by 2003 (Bhatia and Gulati, 
2004). In the case of the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority, a new internal incentive 
mechanism based on a performance-based wage system and a customer satisfaction survey 
improved its financial and operational performance dramatically (Table 2). The enterprise is 
still state-owned but was transformed to an autonomous, commercially oriented and 
financially self-sufficient water company (ADB et al., 2005).  
 
Proposition 5. Public ownership ‘can’ have the advantage if quality is considered publicly 
important and government employees are well incentivized toward cost reduction and quality 
improvement.  
   - 11 - 
Table 2. Performance of Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority  
1993 2003
Customers 26,881 105,771
Billing rate (%) 28 83
Collection rate (%) 50 101
Unaccounted for water (%) 72 17
Total revenue (Billion riels) 0.7 38.6
Total operating expense (Billion riels) 1.4 10.1  
Source: ADB et al. (2005).  
 
There are several shortcomings in the above property rights models. First, ownership and 
provision are designed to be tied together. This may not hold in reality, particularly in the 
recent infrastructure sector where there are a variety of arrangements for private sector 
participation. This problem can be addressed by the infrastructure bundling models in the 
following section. Second, the models do not take into account the government’s 
informational losses from contracting out to the outside (e.g., Schmidt, 1996).
7
                                                 
7 Schmidt (1996) emphasizes the government’s informational losses from contracting. The government cares 
about the social benefit and can acquire a producing firm through nationalization, in which case it can directly 
control production. If the government already owns the production facility, the government can privatize it. 
Only managers can observe the unverifiable true production cost before deciding on the level of production. 
Therefore, if the government privatizes the firm, it loses such important information. The right to have access to 
inside information about the firm translates into a residual right of control. Under nationalization, however, the 
manager does not take into account the social benefit and do not make an effort to the optimal level. Hence, the 
government prefers privatization to nationalization if and only if the social welfare gain through more 
investment outweighs the negative effect of information losses under privatization.  
 Third, it is 
assumed that there is no rent-seeking lobbyist and self-interested politician or government 
(e.g., Boyco et al., 1996). Fourth, there may be a number of potential contractors that can 
undertake a public contract in question. The property rights approach does not provide any 
guidance on how to select the best contractor. This can be answered by auction theory. 
Finally, since contracts are assumed to be incomplete, it is likely that the original contracts 
would be adjusted in due course, especially in the context of infrastructure development, 
which usually takes a considerably long time to accomplish. Some recent models incorporate 
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III. BUNDLING OR UNBUNDLING PUBLIC TASKS?  
 
There are wide variations in how to involve the private sector in infrastructure. In the 
traditional contract theory, as shown above, the government decision is essentially 
dichotomous: whether a public work is produced in-house or contracted out to the outsider. 
And ownership is supposed to go with provision. For instance, in the model by Hart et al. 
(1997), public tasks may be multiple; but they cannot be separated and must be carried out by 
a single agent, i.e., either employees or a private firm. But infrastructure projects can consist 
of a number of elements: planning, financing, construction, operation and maintenance, 
management, service provision, and ownership. Therefore, various types of public private 
partnership (PPP) are possible (Table 3). For instance, ownership can be retained by 
governments, while contracting out management (i.e., management contract) or operation 
and maintenance (i.e., lease or concession). Governments can trade away all the elements to 
the private sector (i.e., divestiture). Governments can also provide public services using 
private financing (i.e., nonrecourse private financing).  
 





Asset ownership  Public Public Public Private
Operation and maintenance  Private Private Private Private
Capital investment  Public Public/Private Private Private
Commercial risk Public Private Private Private
Duration 3-5 years 8-15 years 25-30 yeas Indefinite  
Source: Besant-Jones (2006).  
 
Ownership can be separated from investment and operation. Besley and Ghatak (2001) 
assume that both government and agent care about the quality of public work, showing that 
the optimal ownership depends on the relative importance of the public and private good 
components. The critical assumption of Hart et al. (1997) is that the only government values 
quality or social investment in quality, whereas the agent does not value it directly. 
Conversely, when quality is public goods—i.e., both parties take quality into consideration—
the party that attaches a higher value to quality should own the asset. This holds even if it is   - 13 - 
not the investor or the provider. Otherwise, the investing party should be the owner, because 
the alignment of ownership with investment responsibility will allow to internalize 
externalities and mitigate conflicts of interest.  
 
Proposition 6. If quality is important, the party that attaches the highest value to it should 
own the facility. Otherwise, the owner should be the investor regardless of whether public or 
private.  
 
In Estonia, for instance, the major freight operation and track infrastructure were 
renationalized in 2007, after a 5-year private sector management. The reason is that 
significant concern arose about safety vis-à-vis investment in rolling stock, as in the United 
Kingdom. The government signed an agreement to sell 66 percent of the shares of Estonian 
Railways to an international consortium in April 2001. However, the operator’s safety, traffic 
and financial performance as well as investment in infrastructure were considered 
unsatisfactory. In this case, it was the government that has put a high value on the primary 
public objective of the sector, namely public safety.  
 
Hart (2003) examines a choice of whether bundle or unbundle construction and operation 
tasks, when contracting out both of them. It is assumed that all provision is private. Therefore, 
the model focuses on comparing PPP (bundling) and conventional infrastructure procurement 
(unbundling). With ownership retained, the government can contract with a single private 
entity to build and operate a facility or contract separately with a construction company and 
an infrastructure operator. The contract specifies the basic characteristics of the facility and 
the services it provides, but the contract is incomplete so that the builder can modify the 
investment plan without violating the contract. The problem is that the builder’s investment 
will have an impact on the following operations, as modeled in Hart et al. (1997). Some 
investments are productive, whereas others are not. Investments and their impacts are all 
assumed unverifiable.  
   - 14 - 
Not surprisingly, when tasks are unbundled, the builder invests as little as possible, because it 
neither realizes the social benefit (e.g., quality) nor incurs the operating cost. Under the 
bundling framework or PPP, the concessionaire (i.e., builder and operator) would invest in 
cost reduction and quality improvement, but it would also invest in unproductive activities, 
such as quality-deteriorating cost reduction innovations. This is because the concessionaire 
does care about the cost of operation but may not still take into account the potential social 
benefit. This provides an analogue to the above Proposition (4), which compares state and 
private ownership.  
 
Proposition 7. Bundling construction and operation or PPP provides the better incentive for 
quality improvements and cost-cutting, when the latter has a small adverse effect on the 
former. The unbundling approach or traditional procurement may have the advantage when 
cost-cutting deteriorates quality significantly.  
 
Shortcomings in Hart (2003) are that ownership does not play any role and that the length of 
the contract is assumed given. Bennett and Iossa (2005), incorporating those factors, examine 
a case with multiple tasks and potentially more than one contractor. In this setting, the 
government decides how to delegate two different tasks, capital investment and operation of 
infrastructure, to the private sector. It can either delegate each task to a different contractor or 
contract out both tasks to a consortium of the two firms. The tasks are assumed to require 
individual specialized skills. Therefore, any single agent cannot perform both tasks 
simultaneously. The model also allows the government to retain ownership of the asset and 
transfer it to the private sector at any time, i.e., during the building and managing phases and 
even at the end of the contract period. Hence, both parties have individual residual values of 
the facility. Other major assumptions of the model are maintained following Hart (2003); 
non-contractible effort at the construction stage could improve social benefit or quality of 
public work, thereby reducing the operation and maintenance cost at the following stage and 
increasing the residual value of the project at the end.  
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There are three possible cases. First, it is predicted that bundling construction and operation 
would always be optimal if there exist positive externalities between them. This is the setting 
that the above-mentioned contract theory implicitly assumes. Second, when externalities are 
negative and weak, contracting out the two tasks to separate entities is more preferable. In 
these two cases, the bundled or unbundled project can be either contracted out to the private 
sector (i.e., concessions) or retained by the government (i.e., state-owned enterprises). Under 
private ownership, concessionaries care about cost reduction and the residual value of the 
facility, but do not account for social benefits. Under public ownership, contractors can take 
social benefit into consideration, but only partly. It is because any gain must be shared with 
the government through a bargaining process. But such adverse effects are assumed fairly 
small (i.e., externalities are weak). Finally, if the two tasks exhibit strong negative 
externalities, overinvestment may occur anyway because of the failure of internalization of 
such negative externalities. It means that the contractor in charge of infrastructure 
construction tends to overinvest in useless innovations.   
 
Proposition 8. Contracting-out an infrastructure project with construction and operation 
bundled is always optima, if externalities between those two tasks are positive, the effect of 
investment on cost cutting and quality improvement is relatively small, the effect of 
investment on the residual values is large, and if the private residual value is higher than the 
public residual value.  
 
Bennett and Iossa (2005) also show that if construction and operation exhibit weak negative 
externalities, the preferable structure would tend toward state ownership as the contract 
duration of service provision is getting longer. This is because longer contracts would reduce 
the present value of the residual value of the facility. On the other hand, longer contracts 
would increase the social benefit from investment, because people could enjoy the benefit 
over a longer period of time. Accordingly, government ownership is more favored.  
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Proposition 9. When two public tasks exhibit weak, negative externalities, unbundling is 
optimal. Moreover, public ownership would be superior to fragmented privatization as the 
duration of contracts becomes longer.  
 
In the real world, there are wide variations in PPP transactions, but there is a systematic trend 
reflecting the nature of individual infrastructure sectors (Table 4). The majority of PPP 
transactions take a form of greenfield projects where private firms or public-private joint 
ventures build and operate a new facility for the period specified in the project contract. This 
is a part of concessions in Table 3 and includes build, lease, and transfer (BLT),
8 build, 
operate, and transfer (BOT),










35 5 62 104 206
Greenfield project 971 589 376 226 2162
Concession 103 10 594 241 948
Divestiture 478 203 65 26 772
Total 1587 807 1097 597 4088
 
Concessions are also a common mode of PPP transactions in particular for transport and 
electricity utilities. In the telecommunications sector, in which commercial investments are 
becoming increasingly feasible in recent years, divestiture is also an important tool of private 
sector involvement. In total, more than 90 percent of PPP transactions concluded between 
1990 and 2007 aimed at integrating investment and operation under the greenfield, 
concession or divestiture framework.  
 
Table 4. Number of PPP transactions between 1990 and 2007  
 
Source: PPI database.  
                                                 
8 A private sponsor builds a new facility largely at its own risk, transfers ownership to the government, leases 
the facility from the government and operates it at its own risk up to the expiry of the lease.  
9 A private sponsor builds a new facility at its own risk, operates the facility at its own risk, and then transfers 
the facility to the government at the end of the contract period. The private sponsor may or may not have the 
ownership of the assets during the contract period.  
10 A private sponsor builds a new facility at its own risk, then owns and operates the facility at its own risk.  
11 A private sponsor builds a new facility in a liberalized market in which the government provides no revenue 
guarantees. The private developer assumes construction, operating, and market risk for the project.  
12 Electricity utilities or governments rent mobile power plants from private sponsors for periods ranging from 1 
year to 15 years. A private sponsor places a new facility at its own risk, owns and operates the facility at its own 
risk during the contract period.    - 17 - 
 
Of particular note, there are a considerable number of management and lease contracts in the 
water and sewerage sector. This may reflect the fact that the water sector is especially 
sensitive to political and social consideration. Water provision also has extensive 
externalities for public health and environmental issues. In addition, the scope for introducing 
competition in water and sewerage services is much more limited, because local networks of 
pipes and sewers remain quintessential natural monopolies. The water and sewerage sector 
often requires relatively costly building substance in networks, though the cost of producing 
water is fairly low (Kessides, 2004). These characteristics seem to be consistent with 
Proposition (9). Externalities may not be so significant between operation and construction. 
The long period of time is required to recover the upfront investment. Accordingly, it is often 
required for governments to grant revenue guarantees or operational subsidies.  
 
The unbundling approach may work well in particular in the water and sewerage sector. 
Despite underlying political, social and financial difficulties, some of the commercial 
performance can be improved under the relatively short-term management or lease contract 
framework without any large investment involved. In Yerevan, Armenia, a 4-year 
management contract was awarded for managing a water and sewage system in 2000. 
Performance was linked to various targets: electricity consumption, metering, operating 
hours of service and tariff collection. Electricity consumption was reduced by 30 percent, and 
collection improved from 20 percent to near 100 percent (World Bank, 2006). Similarly, 
since the early 1990s, the Czech Republic has gradually involved the private sector in its 
water and sewerage sector. In České Budějovice, the South Bohemian capital of the republic, 
a private operator was granted a 12-year lease contract in 1999. The private sector 
participation lowered unaccounted-for water from 37 percent in 1999 to 24 percent in 2004. 
A mixed management contract scheme with a public enterprise and a public-private joint 
venture in Conakry, Guinea improved the metering rate from 5 percent before 1989 (year of 
water reform) to near 100 percent in 1996. Labor productivity also increased from 20 to 60 
connections per employee during the same period (Ménard and Clarke, 2002).  
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Even though classified as a concession, it may not necessarily involve significant investment. 
In Colombia, for instance, four major port operations were contracted out to private operators 
under the concession agreements. But little investment was involved in the initial 
concessions. Private sector involvement focusing on operational efficiency together with 
deregulation could increase the port performance remarkably; the number of working days 
per year increased from 280 days in 1993 to 365 days in 1996 (Table 5). The initial problem 
was a lack of competition among ports under the national ownership, rather than a shortage 
of port capacity (Kessides, 2004).  
 




Average vessel waiting time (days) 10 0
Working days per year 280 365
Average working hours per day 16 24
Tones per vessel per day
    Bulk cargo 500 >2,500
    General cargo 750 1,700
Containers per vessel per hour 16 25  
Source: Kessides (2004).  
 
Nonetheless, integrating multiple relevant public tasks into the same ownership is in general 
an optimal choice, as claimed in Propositions (7) and (8). In the above-mentioned case of 
Conakry, the water management contract achieved some performance improvements, such as 
metering and labor productivity. However, other important factors still indicated poor 
performance, because of the compromised ownership system. Although the majority of a 
joint venture is owned by a 10-year private lease contractor (51 percent), the government 
owns 49 percent and is deeply involved in operations. The asset is owned by a state-owned 
enterprise, which is responsible for large investments in treatment plants, reservoirs and pipes 
more than 160 mm in diameter. The joint operating company is responsible for only small 
investments (Ménard and Clarke, 2002). Apparently, the separated ownership seems to have 
weakened incentives for more aggressive investments in quality improvement and cost 
cutting. Worse, the sector may remain dominated by the public nature, violating 
Proposition (4). Unaccounted-for water remained high at 48 percent, compared with the 
international standards of 10 to 20 percent. Labor productivity jumped immediately   - 19 - 
following reform; however, since then it has unchanged at 50 to 60 connections per 
employee. It was still low compared with other developing countries (normally more than 
100 connections per employee).  
 
 
IV. HOW TO SELECT CONTRACTORS?  
 
Even though it is agreeable what should be produced in-house and procured from the outside, 
and how, another challenging issue is how to find the most efficient and reputable contractor 
for a particular contract. In auction theory, there are a number of theoretical propositions. 
This section provides only a few examples relevant to infrastructure procurement.  
 
The first and most important theoretical prediction in auction theory may be the Revenue 
Equivalence Theorem. It requires various assumptions, which may not hold all together in 
reality. The theorem could provide a solid foundation for the government’s choice among 
basic auction platforms. Under the assumptions of (i) singleton and indivisibility of an object, 
(ii) independent and identical distribution of private values, (iii) bidder symmetry, and (iv) 
bidders’ risk neutrality, all the following auctions generate the same expected payoff: open 
ascending-bid, open descending-bid, first-price sealed-bid, and second-price sealed bid 
auctions.  
 
Proposition 10. Under the traditional independent private value paradigm, all four basis 
auction formats would yield the same expected payoff for governments.  
 
In practice, however, there are many variations in auction design. See, for instance, 
Wolfstetter (1996) and Klemperer (2002). Bidders may not be symmetric; some are 
intrinsically strong, and others are not. Bidders’ valuations can be affiliated with one another. 
Bidder entry might be endogenous. It is possible that more than one object is auctioned 
simultaneously.  
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Of particular note, there is a general alleged notion that public procurement might be affected 
by corruption and collusion. Auriol (2006) estimates the cost of corruption to be between 4 
and 10 percent of procurement spending. Under the circumstances where an auctioneer can 
design an award mechanism in the presence of a threat of corruption, it can be shown, 
unsparingly, that in small markets, sole sourcing would be optimal, whereas for large 
purchases, competitive bidding is the best choice. The government is assumed to buy a fixed 
amount of public services from a private firm through a delegate, i.e., public procurement 
authority. It is also assumed that the procurement authority can meet with one firm to side-
contract on its posterior choice of procurement method. Then, there are two forms of 
corruption. While “capture” occurs when a firm takes the initiative of bribing the government 
official to obtain an advantage, “extortion” happens when the official demands a bribe from a 
firm under the threat of excluding it from the procurement process, bribe which is referred to 
as facilitation payments. Since fighting extortion entails costs and yields no benefit, the 
optimal delegation scheme does not prevent it. To cope with the effects of capture, on the 
other hand, public purchasers should receive incentive payments to resist capture, and those 
payments should increase with the size of the purchase.
13
                                                 
13 In practical terms, this should be implemented in tandem with improvements in public sector productivity. 
Otherwise, it would run the risk of the government’s losing fiscal discipline.  
  
 
One of the important factors in the recent electricity sector reform in Andhra Pradesh, India 
is that the state government reinforced the anticorruption mechanism within the utilities 
(Bhatia and Gulati, 2004). A survey of corruption in South Asia conducted by Transparency 
International indicates that petty corruption is endemic in utilities (Table 6) (Word Bank, 
2009). Utility officials may be faced with a lot of opportunities to accept bribes from 
procurement to linesmen, and the bidding and evaluation process is one of the most 
controversial and thus potentially corruption-prone areas (Table 7). Moreover, even if 
procurement is successfully implemented, public utility officials can be a significant 
deterrent factor of the sector reform, as experienced in India. Without proper incentive and 
accountability mechanisms, unions of low-level employees may refuse to refuse to 
materialize important investments, such as meter installation (Gulati and Rao, 2007).    - 21 - 
 
Proposition 11. In order to mitigate capture of public procuring agencies, the government 
has to provide incentive payments to procurement officials in proportion to the size of market.  
 
Table 6. Major actors in power sector corruption 
Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan
Meter readers 26 23 24 36
Billing employee 7 22 22 24
Officers 20 24 13 12




In percentage of respondents reporting corruption with each type of actor. 
Multiple responses were permitted.   
Source: Transparency International; cited in World Bank (2009).  
 
 




Qualification of other firms 41 11.8
Technical evaluation  39 11.3
Application of evaluation criteria 37 10.7
Disqualification of bids 29 8.4
Contract administration 25 7.2
Allegation of fraud and corruption 22 6.4
Payment  20 5.8
Combined financial and technical rating 14 4.0
Irregularity before bid opening  14 4.0
Own qualification issue 14 4.0
Quality of bidding document  14 4.0
Bid security 11 3.2
Technical specifications 10 2.9
Bid and proposal submission 8 2.3
Eligibility 6 1.7
Short listing 6 1.7
Irregularity in bid evaluation 4 1.2
Performance security 3 0.9
Contract award 2 0.6
Prequalification 2 0.6
Transparency issue 2 0.6
Conflict of interest 1 0.3
Domestic preference 1 0.3
Irregularity in bid opening 1 0.3
Terms of reference 1 0.3
Other 19 5.5
Total 346 100.0  
Source: World Bank (2008).  
 
Despite a number of auction models, another auction model that is of particular interest may 
be McAfee and McMillan (1986) and Fishe and McAfee (1987), in both of which the 
principal-agent relationship is examined in the auction contract context. Traditional auction   - 22 - 
theory implicitly assumes that every aspect of an object to be sold is describable and 
contractible. Accordingly, it is presumed that the agreed contract is ex post verifiable and 
enforceable, and that renegotiation and strategic low-balling (overbidding) are outside the 
scope of an analysis. In practice, nonetheless, quality and other aspects are not always 
contractible. If a contract involves significant uncertainty and ex post performance is only 
partially observed, the contract must of necessity have room for ex post adjustments 
depending on what event is realized.  
 
McAfee and McMillan (1986) model the public contract payment as a linear combination of 
each bidder’s bid price (fixed-payment) and a stochastic term (cost-plus payment), i.e., 
payment p is the sum of the bid amount b and a fraction of ex post cost  c * α . It is shown that 
under the symmetric equilibrium assumption, neither the fixed-payment nor the cost-plus 
contract would be optimal when some aspects are not contractible. Rather, the best 
contractual mechanism might be something between the fixed payment and cost-plus 
arrangements. Similarly, Fishe and McAfee (1987) also shows that the contract selected will 
provide the winning firm with the possibility for positive profits either built into the payment 
function (ex ante) or as a result of cheating (ex post). Therefore, there is a clear trade-off 
between resolving ex post incentive problems and minimizing costs in the bidding or ex ante 
phase of contracting.  
 
Proposition 12. The optimal bidding and contract mechanism consists of both fixed payment 
and cost-plus arrangement, if the government cannot observe ex post performance and 
bidders are risk-averse. If bidders are risk neutral, the fixed-payment contract is the best for 
the government.  
 
One practical application is benchmarking of public contracts, both in terms of price and 
quality, against market comparators. The price or quality agreed in the initial contract is 
supposed to be reviewed in due course. It is not exactly a linear model, as modeled in 
McAfee and McMillan (1986). But price or cost is considered to exhibit the cost-plus nature, 
while quantity still follows the fixed-payment mechanism. In the United Kingdom, half of   - 23 - 
public finance initiative (PFI) projects involve benchmarking to assess the value for money 
(NAO, 2001).
14
Apart from auction theory, there are at least two alternative methods of awarding public 
contracts: (i) direct negotiation and (ii) beauty contest. Milgrom (1985) compares auctions 
with direct negotiation and explains why the former is more popular than the latter. Note that 
negotiation is essentially characterized by a bargaining game where the government 
negotiates one-by-one with a series of sellers that make short-lived offers.
  
 
Another may be PPP contracts with some risks transferred back to the public sector. 
Payments to government may be largely fixed in particular in concessions. In many PPP 
transactions, however, governments attempt to mitigate some project risks, especially 
political, regulatory and macroeconomic risks that are difficult for individual firms to avoid, 
by providing minimum revenue guarantees or subsidies. Governments can offer a long-term 
take-or-pay contract for bulk supply facilities to incentivize operators to make continuous 
efforts (see also Proposition 15 below). The minimum traffic or revenue guarantees also have 
the partially similar effect to cost-plus arrangements in the sense that incentives for 




                                                 
14 Though, the usage of such a mechanism has been limited thus far. Only eight of the 54 public procurement 
authorities have actually made use of it.  
15 Short-lived offers make it difficult or impossible for the buyer to compare offers. Milgrom (1985) actually 
focused on a situation in which a seller was dealing with several buyers; the reinterpretation in terms of our 
context is straightforward.  
 Among other 
things, auctions can be the best way to procure even when the government is in a relatively 
weak bargaining position relative to the potential suppliers and the awarded contract can be 
resold. To understand why, consider this simple example adapted from Milgrom’s work. 
Consider a buyer in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis two potential sellers, firms A and B. 
Firm A can produce the item being bought at the lowest cost. If the government conducts an 
auction with a ceiling high enough to ensure that both firms participate, it can expect to buy 
the good from firm A at approximately the same price that firm B would obtain if it were to   - 24 - 
resell the contract to firm A—even though firm B may be in a much better position than the 
government to bargain face to face with firm A. An auction allows a weak bargainer (the 
buyer) to benefit from the abilities of any stronger bargainers that may be present, forcing the 
player with the lowest cost to bid as if it were bargaining with a stronger player.  
 
Asker and Cantillon (2005) also compare auctions and negotiation to procure a public good 
for which both price and quality matter. In their scheme, negotiation performs less effectively 
than a simple scoring auction, in which firms bid on multiple dimensions (here, price and 
quality) and specified scoring rules reduce those dimensions to a single dimension on which 
bids are compared. In an empirical study, Estache et al. (2004) find that, for transport 
infrastructure in Latin America, negotiated contracts have performed worse than bidding 
mechanisms in terms of the percentage of contracts that had to be renegotiated after the 
award.  
 
Bulow and Klemperer (1996) provide a formal model to examine the marginal effect of 
additional competition in an auction in comparison with negotiation. It is indicated that 
competitive bidding is likely to perform better than bilateral negotiation in selecting 
contractors, of which private costs cannot be observed. It is always more valuable for 
procurers to have an extra contractor in the auction than obtaining more bargaining power. 
With few contractors, governments may be able to augment bargaining power against 
contractors. With more contractors, governments might lose bargaining power but could 
induce bidders to reveal their true cost parameters through competitive bidding. In many 
cases, this competition effect would dominate gains from bargaining power.  
 
Proposition 13. Given a certain number of potential contractors, N, an English auction with 
N+1 bidders by seeking one more contender is more profitable for governments than any 
negotiation with N bidders. 
 
Another alternative to auctions is to hold a beauty contest. The design of the beauty contest 
involves the determination of the criteria on which to assess bids, and the weights, if any,   - 25 - 
assigned to each criterion. The distinguishing feature is that at least one item is scored in a 
subjective way. Therefore, like auctions, beauty contests involve a comparison of bids; 
unlike auctions, the award criteria are—at least to some extent—unquantifiable or subjective. 
Beauty contests are advocated in some circles and have been used in some major sales—
among them the sale of the British 2G and the Spanish and Swedish 3G telecom licenses. 
However, auctions are generally considered preferable to beauty contests. Binmore and 
Klemperer (2002) argue that in spectrum right auctions, competitive bidding is better at 
extracting useful information from potential carriers and could achieve an efficient allocation 
of resources, because the licenses are sold to those who actually attached the highest prices to 
the objects.   
 
A key challenge of the beauty contest approach is how to weight multiple criteria. Notably, 
multidimensional auctions have the same problem in practice. It is always controversial how 
to weight various criteria or multidimensional bids. There is no clear answer to this. The 
Swedish spectrum right beauty contest clearly shows the difficulty and lack of transparency 
in evaluating multiple objectives. Somewhat ironically, the reason for the authorities’ 
decision not to use the auction format was exactly their desire to address multiple objectives, 
such as more investment, broader coverage, faster transmission speeds and further 
technological development (Andersson et al., 2005). The awarding decision is very sensitive 
to the weight attached to individual factors (Table 8). If all the criteria had been evaluated 
simultaneously, rather than in the two step approach, the award result could have been 
different. With reason the government decision was actually contested in court by Reach Out 
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Table8. Multiple criteria in Swedish beauty contest for 3G licenses 
Decision Decision
Broadwave communications AB 4,700 14.7 32,750 81 09/2002
Europolitan AB 20,000 27.5 Qualified 165,259 100 01/2001 Awarded
HI3G Access AB 20,814 36.9 Qualified 224,724 100 01/2002 Awarded
Mobility4Sweden AB 8,760 15.3 395,520 100 01/2002
Orange Sweden AB 8,635 19.7 Qualified 364,528 100 08/2001 Awarded
Reach Out Mobile AB 5,238 15.8 259,944 100 04/2001
Tele 2 AB 10,186 17.7 Qualified 112,666 100 10/2001 Awarded
Telenordia Mobil AB 7,200 14.0 Qualified 181,346 98 01/2002
Telia AB 4,100 6.8 308,661 100 01/2002

















1st stage  2nd stage
Criteria Criteria
 
Source: Andersson et al. (2005).  
 
 
V. EX POST ADJUSTMENT OR HARD INCENTIVE CONTRACT?  
 
Infrastructure projects require long-term commitment from owners and operators, regardless 
of whether public or private. In addition, they are technically complex and politically 
sensitive. Therefore, the circumstances surrounding the projects are likely to change over 
time, and it usually comes about that some unforeseen events would emerge almost 
unavoidably.  
 
Traditional incentive theory involving multidimensional tasks (e.g., cost reduction and 
quality requirements) tells that if governments can observe some proxies of the quality of 
public tasks delivered before purchasing, high-powered incentives, such as fixed-payment 
contracts, can be compatible with quality enhancement efforts (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
This is analogous to general search goods, for which buyers can use the level of sales as a 
proxy of product quality, even though quality per se is unverifiable prior to purchasing. In the 
case of experience goods, of which quality can be observed only upon consumption, this is 
not possible; governments are confronted with difficulties in achieving two conflicting tasks, 
cost and quality, by a single policy instrument, i.e., the cost-reimbursement rule. When 
quality is a matter of serious concern, the optimal contract would tend toward low-powered 
incentives, i.e., ex post cost-plus arrangements.    - 27 - 
 
Output-based aid (OBA) is one application of the above principle. In OBA, unlike traditional 
approaches, the payments of aid are linked to the delivery of specific services or outputs. 
Given the pre-agreed specific policy targets, a significant part of the payments of aid, which 
aim to subsidize the cost of particularly noncommercial development activities, would be 
disbursed only after those outcomes have been proven accomplished (GPOBA, 2008). In a 
community water project in Andhra Pradesh, India, for instance, three outputs are set out: (i) 
installing an ultraviolet filter water purification plants in each of 25 villages, (ii) registering 
at least 500 households with water subscription fees paid, and (iii) continuing to operate 
water supply services with customers paying their bills. The official subsidy covers 
investment, community awareness and running costs. Twenty percent of it is designed to be 
disbursed to operators once the first target is achieved. Sixty percent will be paid after the 
second target is met. The rest will be paid after the third output is confirmed (Mandri-Perrott, 
2008). Therefore, it still follows a traditional contractual method, but the authorities can infer 
the quality of outputs from the actual accomplishment and thereby incentivize contractors to 
make an effort to achieve the better quality of projects. See more examples in Table 9.  
 
Proposition 14. Some of the performance-related proxies can be used to complement high-
powered incentive mechanisms particularly if quantity and quality are net complements, even 
though ex post quality per se is not verifiable.  
 
Table 9. Selected example of output-based aid 
Country Project description Output target(s)
Verified outputs     
(as of June, 2008)
Number of 
beneficiaries
Armenia Connect 17,000 low-income households to 
public gas and heating systems
Households with access to heating 
through individual connections or local 
boiler systems
2,344 9,517
Colombia Connect 35,000 families to the natural gas 
distribution network
Households with gas connections 30,412 182,472
India Develop safe drinking water systems in rural 
communities
Villagers with ultraviolet water 
purification systems 
4 12,000
Mongolia Provide telephony and Internet services to 
header communities and soum areas
Public access telephone network 1 22,300
Wireless network for soum 2
Morocco Expand water and sanitation connections to 
11,300 low-income households in peri-urban 
and rural areas




Source: GPOBA (2008).    - 28 - 
 
Reputation is another instrument for ensuring the unverifiable quality of public tasks in the 
dynamic context. Even though public contracts may be characterized as an experience good 
for governments, quality can be governed by the dynamic mechanisms of tracking 
contractors’ past performance. If similar public tasks are put up for public tender repeatedly, 
contractors may be motivated to make an effort toward better quality and establish a 
reputation for fear of disqualification in the future public tendering. This is the same 
mechanism that provides incentives to general firms to keep improving the quality of their 
products and containing their misbehaviors, even though products are experience goods (i.e., 
customers cannot know the quality of a product before they actually consume it).  
 
Calzolari and Spagnolo (2009), formally modeling relational procurement, show that 
governments can reduce the explicit contract duration and repeat open auctions with 
performance-based bonus payments, if non-contractible quality is not so important. 
Conversely, if quality is critical, governments prefer to have an open auction, negotiate with 
a single contractor without incentive payments and keep the relational contract through 
indefinite times of contract renewal (i.e., relational contracting). This is the optimal and 
efficient procurement mechanism when there are a limited number of potential contractors in 
the market. In intermediate cases, governments could use restricted auctions without bonuses 
among preselected loyal contractors. In general, there is a tradeoff between competition and 
quality. The larger number of dedicated contractors could reduce public procurement costs 
because of the increased competition effect. However, it means that the contractors’ expected 
rent would shrink, thereby reducing the equilibrium quality and requiring the optimal 
contract duration to be shorter.  
 
Proposition 15. With a limited number of potential contractors, the optimal procurement 
mechanism is open tendering and then relational contracting, if quality is important. 
Otherwise, open or restricted auctions could be optimal.  
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There are a number of examples of feedback mechanisms in online auctions that materialize 
the reputation effect where the quality of items being traded is ex ante unverifiable (Table 
10). In the public procurement context, the U.S. government also discloses the list of vendors 
excluded from federal procurement on the website. Everyone can access to the black list of 
suppliers and contractors excluded from business with the federal government (Dellarcocas 
et al., 2006).  
 
Table 10. Selected examples of feedback mechanisms in online auctions 
Web site Category Feedback mechanism
eBay Online marketplace Buyer and sellers rate one another following 
transaction.
Amazon Online marketplace Buyer and sellers rate one another following 
transaction.
Google Search engine Search results are ordered based on how many sites 
contain links that point to them.
Slashdot Online discussion board Positing a prioritized list based on the ratings they 
receive from readers.
Citysearch Entertainment guide Users rate restaurants, bars, hotels, etc.
eLance Professional services 
marketplace
Contractors rate their subcontractors.
Epinons Online opinions forum Users write reviews about products, and others rate 
usefulness of reviews.   
Source: Dellarocas et al. (2006).  
 
Despite some of these possibilities to mitigate unobservability prior to signing a contract, ex 
post adjustments may still be unavoidable for some exogenous reasons. Because of 
contractual incompleteness and because governments can by no means transfer ultimate 
business risk to private operators (i.e., hold-up problem), bidders would also have a strong 
incentive to submit unrealistic bids, often referred to as “low balling” and initiate 
renegotiation afterward (Ware et al., 2007). In fact, Guasch (2004) shows that about 30 
percent of PPP infrastructure transactions underwent renegotiation within two years after the 
awards in the Latin American and Caribbean region. In the United Kingdom 55 percent of 
public finance initiative (PFI) projects experienced some changes in the contracts (NAO, 
2001). One may consider the flexibility to ex post adjust a contract as beneficial under highly 
uncertain environment. However, ex post adjustments are in general considered much costly. 
Cost overruns and delays in infrastructure projects incur massive economic costs (Flyvbjerg, 
2005). Bajari et al. (2006) estimates the adaptation cost reflected in the real bids at about 2.7 
dollars per one dollar of expected contract adjustment.    - 30 - 
 
Bajari and Tedelis (2001) highlights a clear tradeoff between providing right incentives and 
reducing ex post renegotiation costs, in favor of adjustable contractual forms when an object 
being sold is complex. Rigid fixed-price contracts can fully incentivize contractors to contain 
costs. But if the contract is found incomplete, the adjustment cost could be significant. By 
contrast, under the more flexible regime, such as cost-plus contracts, adjustments may be less 
costly, but there is no incentive for cost reduction. The crucial determinant is the cost of ex 
post adjustments or the complexity of a project being procured. When an object being 
procured is highly complex, customized and costly to design and specify the details, cost-
plus contracts, i.e., ex post adjustable arrangements, will be preferred to hard incentive 
contracts. This superiority of flexible contracts may be consistent with the reason for public 
ownership or in-house provision of infrastructure in incentive theory.  
 
Proposition 16. Cost-plus contracts are preferable to fixed-payment contracts when a project 
is highly complex and the cost of ex ante contract preparation and specification is large.  
 
Evidence shows that both governments and private contractors would in fact initiate 
renegotiation (Figure 2). In 68 road concessions in Latin America, the majority of 
renegotiation was initiated by the government side, if renegotiated. In the railway sector, out 
of 28 concessions, half were underwent renegotiation, and all of them were initiated by 
private operators (Estache et al., 2008). In Argentina, most of the concessionaires started 
disputing with the government, since the government converted the dollar-denominated rates 
to devalued pesos and refused any significant tariff adjustments, despite the fact that the 
initial contract clauses allowed for indexation to the dollar. Similarly, the local mayor in 
Brazil denied the automatic tariff adjustments stipulated in the Limeira water concession 
(Guasch et al., 2007). There are other possible reasons for renegotiation. The fundamental 
reason is that some revenue and/or cost conditions would change exogenously or 
endogenously beyond the reasonable assumptions accounted for in the original contracts. 
Tariff, demand forecasts and investment requirements are the most common three reasons for 
renegotiation (Figure 3).    - 31 - 
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Source: Estache et al. (2008).  
 
 
















Share in total renegotiated contracts (%)
Note: The reasons for renegotiation could be multifold; thus percentages may 
add over 100 percent. 
 
Source: Estache et al. (2008).  
 
Even under the assumption that contracts are complete, public ownership may be preferred 
because of the significant cost of contracting. Levin and Tadelis (2005) shows that if some 
contingencies are left out of the contract due to costly contracting, an optimal contract for 
governments would be either to pay the agent for meeting a minimal time requirement or for 
meeting a contracted performance requirement. But it should not be both. This is because that 
time and effort are assumed substitutes for the purpose of improving quality. If both time and 
quality constraints are specified in the same contract, the agent can achieve a given level of   - 32 - 
quality at lower costs by substituting effort for time, because time is less costly than effort 
(by construction). While the minimal time requirement can be understood as in-house 
provision, the performance requirement represents contracting-out to the outside. Contracting 
with the private sector requires a costly specification of performance requirements but avoids 
the low level of employee incentives associated with in-house provision. 
 
Hart (2003) also emphasizes the importance of relative contracting costs. It is concluded that 
the choice between PPP and conventional provision turns on whether it is easier to write 
contracts for service provision than for building provision. Traditional public goods provision 
(unbundling) is appropriate if the quality of upfront investment can be well specified, 
whereas the quality of subsequent operations cannot be easily contracted. On the other hand, 
PPP tends to be better if the quality of operations can be set out in the initial contract but the 
quality of investment cannot be specified. This is the case if good performance measures are 
available to reward or penalize the service provider, as in relatively short-term management 
and lease contracts focusing on improving a particular set of commercial factors.  
 
Proposition 17. When contracting with private contractors can be complete but remains 
costly, the optimal contract is either in-house provision or performance payments. If 
infrastructure operation is more costly to specify, traditional procurement is better. Rather, if 
investment is more costly to contract, PPP is better.  
 
One innovative public procurement procedure that could reduce the cost of contracting in 
public procurement may be competitive dialogue. In 2004, the EU Directive introduced this 
new bidding process, which is supposed to be used to procure particularly complex objects. 
Under the competitive dialogue procedure, public procuring authorities take advantage of 
dialogue with qualified potential contractors to identify the optimal scope of projects. Until 
the scope is determined, authorities can facilitate implicit competition for an innovative 
solution and take advantage of information held by private companies (NAO, 2007). This 
may be characterized as an interim form between beauty contests and traditional auctions and   - 33 - 
could reduce the cost of contracting in favor of contracting out infrastructure under high-
powered incentives (as following Proposition 16).  
 
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Infrastructure has particular challenges in public procurement, because it is a highly complex 
and customized object, requiring economic, political, social and environmental 
considerations from a long time horizon. To deliver public infrastructure services to citizens 
or taxpayers, there are a series of decisions that governments have to make. This paper 
characterizes the decisions as a four-stage process: (i) whether to provide in-house or 
contract out, (ii) whether to bundle or unbundle investment and operation, (iii) how to select 
contractors, and (iv) whether to contract ex ante or adjust ex post. At each stage, there are 
important economic theories that could guide governments to wise decision-making.  
 
In general, theory suggests that it would be a good option to contract out infrastructure to the 
private sector under high-powered incentive mechanisms, such as fixed-price contracts. 
However, it holds under certain conditions. Key factors include the social benefit from 
investment, such as quality of public services, and the cost of preparing a contract. If cost-
cutting investment has a significant adverse effect on quality, the public ownership can 
perform better. This may be the case in the public transport sector where the safety of the 
public cannot be compromised at any cost. This principle may also be applicable to the 
power generation sector where economic efficiency is not always compatible with 
environmental and social objectives. Infrastructure development in remote areas is another 
example.  
 
In addition, the cost of contracting matters a lot. If it is prohibitively high, cost-plus contracts 
or ex post adjustments would be an appropriate way of procuring infrastructure. It makes 
little sense to attempt to prepare a complete contract for the long-term infrastructure 
procurement. It is more important for stakeholders involved to agree on how to deal with   - 34 - 
unanticipated events that might happen. In that context, it is worth reiterating that high- and 
low-powered incentive mechanisms can coexist, as seen in the benchmarking of public 
contracts and partially-risk guaranteed PPP projects.  
 
Finally, theory tells that ownership should be aligned with the ultimate responsibility for or 
objective of infrastructure provision. Private ownership can deal with investment in cost 
reduction to a large extent and quality improvement to a lesser extent. But social benefits 
might be undermined under private ownership. Public ownership can potentially control 
social benefits better, but in-house provision is essentially inferior to motivate government 
officials to make an effort toward better quality and lower costs, though not impossible. If 
more than one public task exhibits positive externalities, it would be a better option to 
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